Grounding the Short Circuit: The Need for Supreme Court Intervention in Scienter Pleading Requirements for Private Securities Fraud Cases After the Second Circuit’s Decision in \u3ci\u3eATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.\u3c/i\u3e, 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) by Ehrich, Joe
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 1 Article 8 
2012 
Grounding the Short Circuit: The Need for Supreme Court 
Intervention in Scienter Pleading Requirements for Private 
Securities Fraud Cases After the Second Circuit’s Decision in ATSI 
Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 
2007) 
Joe Ehrich 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Joe Ehrich, Grounding the Short Circuit: The Need for Supreme Court Intervention in Scienter Pleading 
Requirements for Private Securities Fraud Cases After the Second Circuit’s Decision in ATSI 
Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007), 91 Neb. L. Rev. (2013) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol91/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Note*
Grounding the Short Circuit:
The Need for Supreme Court
Intervention in Scienter Pleading
Requirements for Private
Securities Fraud Cases After the
Second Circuit’s Decision in ATSI
Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund,
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
B. The Post-PSLRA Circuit Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
III. The Post-Tellabs Second Circuit Response: ATSI
Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
IV. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
A. The ATSI standard conflicts with Tellabs by
allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter through
individual allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
B. The ATSI standard prevents full use of the Tellabs
review process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
C. ATSI conflicts with the Supreme Court’s intent to
create a heightened, uniform scienter pleading
standard capable of reducing frivolous litigation . . . . 260
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Joe Ehrich, J.D. Candidate, University of Nebraska College of Law, 2012.  The
author would like to dedicate this note to his wonderful wife, children, and par-
ents, who inspired and supported him in writing this note and throughout law
school.
238
2012] GROUNDING THE SHORT CIRCUIT 239
D. The ATSI decision ensured a circuit split and
provided a guide for the renewal of the wide split
over motive and opportunity allegations . . . . . . . . . . . 264
E. The Supreme Court should fortify the Tellabs
standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
I. INTRODUCTION
A securities litigation defense attorney is currently seated at his
desk considering the possibility that a securities fraud class action
lawsuit will be filed against his client, the Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) of Doe Corporation, by a group of the company’s shareholders.
Doe’s share price recently plummeted from $50 to $5 after the com-
pany announced that it had prematurely recognized revenue and
would be forced to restate its revenue projections for the upcoming
quarter.  Shortly after the announcement, a group of shareholders
learned that the CFO’s compensation package is tied to the company’s
attainment of a $50 common stock share price.  Although his client is
innocent, the attorney believes the shareholders will view this as a
case of securities fraud and file suit against the CFO, alleging that
due to the large compensation, he stood to gain from reaching this
share price, and with his ability to influence the company’s revenue
projections, he possessed the motive and opportunity to defraud Doe’s
investors.  Such allegations may create a strong inference that the
CFO acted with the required state of mind, or scienter,1 which is a
mental state that reflects a defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud.”2  Scienter is a required element of a private securities
fraud claim.3
Of course, these kinds of allegations could be equally, if not more
suggestive of innocent behavior,4 and only constitute relevant, not dis-
1. The Second Circuit’s position is that these allegations are sufficient to create this
inference. E.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 310
(2007)) (stating that allegations of a defendant’s motive and opportunity to de-
fraud constitute facts that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind and referring to this requirement as “a ‘strong’
inference of scienter”).  However, due to a split of authority regarding this issue,
the adequacy of such allegations in giving rise to such an inference depends upon
the circuit where the claim is filed.  For a discussion of circuit opinions on this
issue, see infra section IV.D.
2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
3. Id. at 193.
4. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 655 (8th Cir.
2001) (“[H]aving the motive and opportunity to do wrong are certainly not the
same as having the intent to do it.”); Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d
1061, 1068–69 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 818 F.
Supp. 971, 976 (N.D. Tex. 1993)) (finding that “[i]t does not follow that because
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positive, factors that must be considered with the rest of the com-
plaint’s allegations in determining whether a plaintiff has adequately
pleaded scienter.5  If the plaintiffs file in a federal court in the Third
Circuit, where Doe’s corporate headquarters is located, they cannot
rely only on individual allegations of motive and opportunity to plead
scienter.  Rather, they must use the complaint’s entire allegations,
which can include motive and opportunity, to demonstrate an infer-
ence of scienter that is at least as compelling as the inference of the
CFO’s innocent state of mind, which the allegations will also suggest.6
The plaintiffs can also expect, after receiving the CFO’s likely motion
to dismiss,7 that a court reviewing their complaint will consider its
collective allegations, compare the competing inferences, and only al-
low it to advance if the scienter inference is at least as likely as the
innocent inference.8  In holding plaintiffs to these requirements, the
Third Circuit applies the stringent scienter pleading standard created
by the Supreme Court in Tellabs,9 which will prompt dismissal of the
meritless complaint10 and spare the CFO from the untenable, albeit
almost inevitable, task of settling an invalid claim.11
executives have components of their compensation keyed to performance, one can
infer fraudulent intent”); Stephen L. Ascher & Daniel B. Tehrani, Motive and
Opportunity Are Not Enough, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. J., Summer 2008, available at
http://www.jenner.com/system/assets/publications/695/original/Securities_Lit_
Journal_Ascher_Summer2008.pdf?1313771978 (arguing that the motive and op-
portunity to defraud are not very indicative of intent).
5. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325.
6. Id. at 328 (requiring plaintiffs to plead “an inference of scienter at least as likely
as any plausible opposing inference”).  Because the Supreme Court has applied
this review process provision to the pleading requirements that plaintiffs must
meet, it is logical to presume that the other provisions also apply in the pleading
context.
7. See infra note 207 and the sources cited therein.
8. Institutional Investors Grp v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252–53, 267–68 (3d Cir.
2009) (stating that in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, plain-
tiffs must plead a strong inference of the required state of mind; that this “strong
inference of scienter” requirement obligates courts to examine the collective alle-
gations and weigh the competing inferences; and that such an inference must be
as compelling as the opposing inference).
9. See id. at 267–68 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313–14, 323–24, 326).
10. See infra note 157, the sources cited therein, and the accompanying text.
11. See Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Note, Private Securities Litigation:
The Need for Reform, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 302–04 (1998) (stat-
ing that the prospect of high discovery costs motivated companies in the pre-
PSLRA era to settle even frivolous claims); James A. Kassis, The Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Review of Its Key Provisions and an Assess-
ment of Its Effects at the Close of 2001, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 123–24
(2001) (describing how even frivolous claims that survive the motion to dismiss
process are commonly settled); Laurae Rossi, Comment, Choosing the Best Stan-
dard of Pleading Under the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, and
Why the Ninth Circuit’s Standard Under In Re Silicon Graphics Conquers the
Battle of the Circuits, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 263, 265 (2002) (“Securities fraud law-
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However, if the plaintiffs choose to file in the neighboring Second
Circuit, these individual allegations of motive and opportunity alone
will be sufficient to plead scienter.12  Further, because courts in the
Second Circuit have shown a proclivity for basing their scienter plead-
ing findings solely upon the presence or absence of such allegations, a
court reviewing the complaint after a motion to dismiss may summa-
rily find that scienter—and therefore an inference as compelling as
the opposing, innocent inference—has been pleaded.13  If the court fol-
lows this review process, as others in the Second Circuit have done, it
will not study the collective allegations, examine and compare the
competing inferences, or determine whether the plaintiffs actually
pleaded an equally strong inference of scienter.14  Under such permis-
sive pleading and dismissal review procedures, it is unlikely the court
will dismiss the shareholders’ lawsuit, even if it is meritless,15 mean-
ing the CFO may end up paying for something that he did not do.
Why the disparity in pleading standards between these two cir-
cuits?  Quite simply, the Second Circuit, in ATSI, disregarded the
pleading and review instructions the Supreme Court established in
Tellabs by stating that plaintiffs may plead a strong inference of scien-
ter using only allegations of motive and opportunity or conscious mis-
behavior or recklessness.16  This decision has allowed plaintiffs to
plead scienter using only such individual allegations;17 encouraged
courts within the Second Circuit to conduct abbreviated reviews of
complaints at the dismissal stage;18 undermined the Court’s intent for
a heightened, uniform scienter pleading standard capable of reducing
frivolous litigation and allowing the advancement of meritorious
claims;19 and contributed to the renewal of a wide circuit split over
whether motive and opportunity allegations are sufficient to plead sci-
enter.20  In sharp contrast to the divergent policies and practices of
the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit adopted the full Tellabs provi-
sions.21  It therefore utilizes the scienter pleading standard that the
Supreme Court intended.
Given the serious consequences of this split, the Second Circuit
standard merits further discussion.  This Note begins by discussing
suits that withstand a motion to dismiss usually settle due to the exorbitant costs
of defending the suit on the merits.”).
12. See infra section IV.A.
13. See infra section IV.B.
14. See infra section IV.B.
15. See infra text accompanying note 162.
16. See infra section IV.A.
17. See infra section IV.A.
18. See infra section IV.B.
19. See infra section IV.C.
20. See infra section IV.D.
21. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267–68, 277
(3d Cir. 2009).
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the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which estab-
lished the pleading requirements for private securities fraud claims.
Part II details the post-PSLRA circuit split over motive and opportu-
nity allegations, and the pleading provisions the Supreme Court es-
tablished in Tellabs.  Part III describes the pleading prescriptions
created by the Second Circuit in ATSI.  Part IV discusses how the
ATSI standard diverges from Tellabs by allowing plaintiffs to plead
scienter through individual allegations, which has led to only partial
application of the Tellabs dismissal review process in the Second Cir-
cuit and has undermined the Supreme Court’s intent for a heightened,
uniform scienter pleading standard capable of reducing frivolous
claims.  This Part also details how ATSI contributed to the post-Tel-
labs circuit split over motive and opportunity allegations, and argues
that the Supreme Court must rectify this untenable situation by forti-
fying the Tellabs review test.  If the Court does not, plaintiffs who sue
in the Second Circuit, as the Doe shareholders may, will continue to
receive more favorable treatment at the pleading stage and have a
greater opportunity to receive undeserved settlements from innocent
defendants such as the Doe CFO than those who sue in the Third
Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)
In December 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act (PSLRA)22 to eliminate abuses in the private securi-
ties fraud class action realm.23  One abuse was frivolous lawsuits,
which, due to the prospect of significant discovery expenses, defend-
ants often settled.24  Congress sought to eliminate frivolous lawsuits
through the provisions of the PSLRA,25 such as stronger Rule 11 sanc-
22. Congress passed the bill through a Congressional override of President Clinton’s
veto. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995); 141 CONG. REC.
H15,223–24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
23. Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 194 (1998); Kassis,
supra note 11, at 120; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (stating that the Conference Report
“seeks to protect . . . all who are associated with our capital markets from abusive
securities litigation”).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32, 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731, 736; Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Mar-
kets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1021–22 (2003); Catina & Schmitt, supra
note 11, at 302, 305–06.
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731; see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,083 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Reid) (describing the PSLRA as “a bipartisan piece of legisla-
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tions,26 a limit on damages,27 and a pleading standard,28 which re-
quires the plaintiff, for each alleged violation, to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind,”29 or scienter.30
The “strong inference” condition was a prominent change because
it affected the pleading requirements for and recovery abilities of
plaintiffs who sought to bring private securities fraud class action law-
suits.  Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
illegal to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.”31  Plaintiffs may bring private actions under
tion designed to curtail the filing of frivolous security strike suits”); 141 CONG.
REC. H2,763 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Eshoo) (“[Congress] must
craft a piece of legislation that stops the [frivolous litigation].”).
26. Shaun Mulreed, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How
Scienter Has Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from
Achieving Its Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 801–02 (2005); Oldham, supra
note 24, at 1022–23; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2006).
27. Mulreed, supra note 26, at 798–800; Oldham, supra note 24, at 1023–24; see 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2006).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 (stating that Congress heard testimony “on the need to
establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless lawsuits” and stating that “the Conference Committee intends to
strengthen existing pleading requirements”); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,149
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (stating that the pleading
standard will ensure that claims that advance are meritorious); 141 CONG. REC.
S17,969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (stating that the
conference report adopted the Second Circuit’s pleading standard to “weed out
frivolous cases early”).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
30. Congress viewed scienter as the “required state of mind.”  193 CONG. REC.
H14,041 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (referring to the “re-
quired state of mind” as “[t]he bill’s elevated pleading standard for scienter”); 141
CONG. REC. S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting
that the bill’s pleading standard requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity
facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter).  Courts have also reached
this conclusion. See Brian S. Sommer, Note, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence:
Improving Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena With a Screening
Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 420, 424 (2005) (reciting the scienter
standard developed by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976), and stating that “courts have deduced [this requirement] to
mean the standard announced . . . in Hochfelder”).  Due to the interchangeability
of these terms, this Note will use the term “scienter” and the phrase “strong infer-
ence of scienter” to refer to the pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
244 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:238
Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5,32 which make it unlawful to use a
scheme to defraud, make a false statement of a material fact, omit a
material fact, or engage in an act that would defraud someone in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security.33  Because the Su-
preme Court had held that private securities fraud claims must allege
scienter, or an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”34 a provi-
sion that required plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that give
rise to a strong inference of scienter represented a significant change
in pleading requirements and a heightened challenge to a plaintiff’s
ability to recover.35  Congress, however, viewed this uniform, en-
hanced scienter pleading standard for all such lawsuits as a way to
reduce frivolous lawsuits and allow valid claims to advance.36
While Congress sought a uniform, heightened scienter pleading
standard, a dispute arose—and was inconclusively resolved—over the
types of allegations sufficient to meet such a standard.  Although Con-
gress derived the “strong inference” language from the Second Cir-
cuit’s pre-PSLRA pleading standard,37 codification of the circuit’s full
standard, under which scienter could be established by allegations of a
32. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007) (stating
that the Supreme Court has construed Section 10(b) as providing a right of ac-
tion); Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
34. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
35. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,047 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(arguing that the bill’s pleading standard “turns the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure on their head” and “makes it a virtual impossibility that sufficient facts can
be alleged”); 193 CONG. REC. H14,041 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Dingell) (“The conference report places highly burdensome pleading require-
ments on plaintiffs.”); 141 CONG. REC. S17,950 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Bryan) (“[The bill’s] pleading requirements are more difficult.”); André
Douglas Pond Cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 1994 Republican
Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the
Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1007–08,
1008 n.129 (2005).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 (stating that Congress heard testimony “on the need to
establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless lawsuits”); see also 141 CONG. REC. S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that the bill’s pleading standard “should help
weed out at an early stage lawsuits filed against innocent defendants”); Anthony
D. Weis, Comment, Striking an Imbalance: The Interpretation of Section
21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Silicon Graphics, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1741, 1772–73 (1998) (stating that the PSLRA imposed, among other provi-
sions, more stringent pleading standards in an effort to strike a better balance
between allowing securities fraud victims to pursue a remedy and deterring
abuse by frivolous claims).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 740 (stating that the PSLRA pleading standard was “based in part on the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit,” which required a “ ‘strong inference’ of
the defendant’s fraudulent intent”).
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defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit fraud or strong circum-
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness,38 became a
contentious issue.  Senator Arlen Specter, whose amendment incorpo-
rating the full Second Circuit standard was added to the Senate bill,39
questioned the logic of codifying the “strong inference” language but
not the types of allegations adequate to establish this inference.40
However, the conference committee, in its desire to “strengthen ex-
isting pleading requirements,” declined to adopt the circuit’s interpre-
tive case law.41  This omission prompted President Clinton to issue a
veto—which Congress later overrode42—for a bill that he felt would
“[close] the courthouse door on investors [with] legitimate claims.”43
Unfortunately, the types of allegations sufficient to plead scienter
were not decided, as the statute failed to specify any such allega-
tions,44 and members of Congress suggested the PSLRA both had and
had not codified the Second Circuit standard.45
Congress’s inconsistent messages and failure to define the ade-
quate types of allegations laid the groundwork for the eventual under-
mining of its goal of a uniform, heightened pleading standard.  The
inconsistent messages concerning the adoption of the Second Circuit
standard46 increased the risk that some courts would adopt the stan-
dard while others fashioned a stronger standard,47 thus eliminating
38. See, e.g., Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1995); Cohen v.
Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.,
9 F.3d 259, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1993).
39. 141 CONG. REC. S9,171–72 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
40. Id. at S9,171.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
42. 141 CONG. REC. S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. H15,223–24
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
43. 141 CONG. REC. H15,214–15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto message of President
Clinton).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
45. 141 CONG. REC. S19,067–68 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(pointing approvingly to assertions by the academic community that the bill’s
pleading standard is “faithful to the Second Circuit’s test”); 141 CONG. REC.
S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that the bill
“adopts the [S]econd [C]ircuit pleading standard”); Nicole M. Briski, Comment,
Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did
Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
155, 169–70 nn.104–05 (2000).
46. See supra text accompanying note 45.
47. This is precisely what occurred after the passage of the PSLRA, as the Third
Circuit, after reviewing the bill’s “contradictory and inconclusive” legislative his-
tory, adopted the motive and opportunity test based upon Congress’s near-total
codification of the Second Circuit standard, which the court saw as indicative of
Congress’s desire to promulgate a standard equal in strength to the Second Cir-
cuit’s standard. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531–35 (3d Cir.
1999).  However, the Ninth Circuit found that the bill’s legislative history re-
flected Congress’s desire to create a scienter pleading standard that was stronger
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the opportunity for a single, heightened scienter pleading standard for
all private securities fraud class action complaints.  Congress’s failure
to define the types of allegations that are sufficient to establish scien-
ter48 also created the possibility that even if courts declined to adopt
the Second Circuit standard, circuits would search for guidance from
dissimilar lines of reasoning and would thus promulgate different
standards of varying strengths.49  Given this potential for differing in-
terpretations, it is unsurprising that a circuit split emerged.
B. The Post-PSLRA Circuit Split
Despite Congress’s intent to create a uniform, heightened pleading
standard and the consensus over the adequacy of recklessness in
showing scienter, a circuit split over the sufficiency of motive and op-
portunity allegations emerged in the years following PSLRA’s pas-
sage.  In their respective post-PSLRA opinions, the circuit courts
followed the Supreme Court’s definition in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder that scienter constitutes the intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud,50 and found that plaintiffs can plead scienter by alleging a
than the Second Circuit’s and therefore declined to adopt the motive and opportu-
nity test. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977–79 (9th Cir.
1999).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
49. This also occurred after the passage of the PSLRA, as the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that while allegations showing only motive and opportunity are insuffi-
cient, such allegations, if showing more, might contribute to pleading “the
required state of mind.”  Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285–87
(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).  After interpreting “the re-
quired state of mind” to constitute severe recklessness, the court concluded that
only allegations showing severe recklessness, which could include evidentiary
motive and opportunity allegations, would suffice. Id. at 1285–87.  Conversely,
the Ninth Circuit found that the legislative history of the PSLRA suggested that
Congress had adopted a standard that was stronger than that of the Second Cir-
cuit. In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 976–79.  It concluded that only allegations show-
ing deliberate recklessness—which does not include allegations of motive and
opportunity—are sufficient to establish scienter, a position it derived from its
prior holding that deliberate recklessness constitutes “the required state of
mind.” Id. (en banc) (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
50. E.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 593–94 (7th Cir.
2006); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir.
2003); In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 2002); Fla.
State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp, 270 F.3d 645, 653 (8th Cir. 2001);
Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001); City of Phila. v.
Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 194, 201 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the “required state of
mind” is defined in this manner and finding that the PSLRA did not change the
substantive scienter definition); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1281–82 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th
Cir. 1999); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.
1999); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
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form of recklessness,51 which the circuits defined uniformly.52  De-
spite the circuit unanimity on these issues, the groundwork for a split
over the sufficiency of motive and opportunity allegations was laid in
Press,53 in which the Second Circuit held, without offering any qualifi-
cation, that facts showing a defendant’s motive and opportunity to
commit fraud or constituting strong circumstantial evidence of con-
scious misbehavior or recklessness satisfy the PSLRA’s strong infer-
ence pleading requirement.54  The court reached this conclusion after
summarily acknowledging that the PSLRA had heightened the scien-
ter pleading requirements to the Second Circuit’s level.55  Soon after,
the Third Circuit affirmed its use of the same standard.56  It con-
cluded that “Congress’s use of the Second Circuit’s language compels
the conclusion that [PSLRA] establishes a pleading standard approxi-
mately equal in stringency to that of the Second Circuit.”57
In adopting a scienter pleading standard that could be met through
individual allegations of motive and opportunity, the Second Circuit
employed an easily satisfied, plaintiff-friendly standard.  Securities
fraud defendants are frequently presented with situations that could
give rise to a motive and opportunity to defraud,58 which means that
51. E.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 600; Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 344; In
re IKON, 277 F.3d at 667 (using the recklessness concept employed in other cir-
cuits to define scienter, although not explicitly stating that recklessness suffices);
Fla. State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 653 n.7, 653–54; Nathenson, 267 F.3d at
407–10; City of Phila., 264 F.3d at 1259; Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d
Cir. 2000); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198–201; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Com-
share, 183 F.3d at 549–50; In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 977.
52. E.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 600 (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)); Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 343
(quoting Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999)); In re IKON,
277 F.3d at 667 (quoting SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir.
2000)); Fla. State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 654 (quoting Camp v. Dema, 948
F.2d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 1991)); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408 (quoting Broad v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981)); City of Phila., 264
F.3d at 1258 (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th
Cir. 1996)); Rothman, 220 F.3d at 90 (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198 (quoting Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)); Bryant, 187 F.3d
at 1282 n.18 (quoting McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814
(11th Cir. 1989)); In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550 (quoting Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979)); In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 976
(quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990)).
53. Press, 166 F.3d 529.
54. Id. at 537–38.
55. Id.
56. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999).
57. Id. at 534.
58. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Car-
ley Capital Grp. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga.
1998)) (“Greed is a ubiquitous motive, and corporate insiders and upper manage-
ment always have [the] opportunity to lie and manipulate.”); Ascher & Tehrani,
248 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:238
plaintiffs had an easy task in discerning and alleging such behavior.59
The permissiveness of the standard also flowed from its lesser sub-
stantive requirement, as motive is a lesser form of intent than reck-
lessness,60 and the fact that it could be satisfied without the use of
discovery, which critics viewed as a necessity of the PSLRA pleading
standard.61  In demonstrating a willingness to look past weak asser-
tions of motive and opportunity to find that plaintiffs had successfully
pleaded such allegations—and thus scienter—the Second Circuit also
lent a hand to plaintiffs.62  While the Second Circuit after Press cau-
tioned that “litigants and lower courts need and should not employ or
rely on magic words such as ‘motive and opportunity,’”63 and required
that motive allegations entail “a concrete and personal benefit to the
supra note 4; see also Globis Capital Partners, L.P. v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 241 F.
App’x 832, 836 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In every corporate transaction, the corporation
and its officers have a desire to complete the transaction, and officers will usually
reap financial benefits from a successful transaction.” (quoting GSC Partners
CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004))).
59. See Bruce Cannon Gibney, Comment, The End of the Unbearable Lightness of
Pleading: Scienter After Silicon Graphics, 48 UCLA L. REV. 973, 1013 n.245
(2001) (indicating that a reason why scienter can be plead with ease under the
motive and opportunity test is because securities fraud defendants often have the
motive and opportunity to defraud); see also Weis, supra note 36, at 1773 (“[T]he
proof required to establish motive and opportunity [is] most consistent with the
type of information typically available to a victim of securities fraud prior to
discovery.”).
60. Compare Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 655
(8th Cir. 2001) (“[H]aving the motive and opportunity to do wrong are certainly
not the same as having the intent to do it.”), and Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4
(arguing that allegations of motive are not especially probative of intent), with
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (“In certain areas of
the law[,] recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct.”).
61. Discovery is not necessary to satisfy this standard because the circumstances un-
derlying motive and opportunity allegations can be discovered—and thus this be-
havior can be alleged—with ease. See supra text accompanying notes 58–59.
However, critics thought that the PSLRA pleading standard would impose a
greater burden on plaintiffs.  141 CONG. REC. S19,071–72 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(letter from Roberta Cooper Ramo, President of the American Bar Association)
(stating that it is “utterly impossible” to plead the defendant’s state of mind prior
to discovery); 141 CONG. REC. S19,038 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes) (“It simply will be impossible for the plaintiff, without discovery, to
meet the [pleading] standard.” (quoting a letter from John Sexton, Dean of the
New York University School of Law)); 193 CONG. REC. H14,041 (daily ed. Dec. 6,
1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (stating that the pleading standard “will re-
quire average investors without discovery to know and state facts in pleadings
that are only knowable after discovery”).
62. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270–71 (2d Cir. 1993)) (“The Second
Circuit has been lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judg-
ment based on fairly tenuous inferences.”).
63. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000).
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individual defendants resulting from the fraud,”64 these measures did
little to bolster the least stringent post-PSLRA pleading standard.65
The Ninth Circuit took the opposite position in In re Silicon Graph-
ics Inc. Securities Litigation66 by rejecting the motive and opportunity
test,67 thereby widening the split that began in Press.  The court ad-
hered to its prior holdings that recklessness demonstrating inten-
tional misconduct is adequate to establish the “required state of
mind.”68  It thoroughly examined the legislative history of the
PSLRA—focusing on the conference committee’s rejection of the Spec-
ter Amendment, its failure to adopt the Second Circuit standard and
interpretive case law, and Congress’s override of President Clinton’s
veto69—to reach its conclusion that “Congress adopted a standard
more stringent than the Second Circuit standard.”70  Based upon this,
the court created a new, more stringent standard that required a
plaintiff to “plead, at a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a
strong inference of deliberate or conscious recklessness,” which could
not be satisfied by allegations of a defendant’s motive and opportunity
to commit fraud.71
The refusal of the other circuits to take such decisive positions on
the adequacy of allegations of motive and opportunity worsened the
circuit split.  The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Eleventh Circuits have
each held that allegations that show only motive and opportunity, but
do not show that the defendant acted with a form of recklessness that
is sufficient to show scienter, are insufficient to satisfy the strong in-
ference standard.72  While finding motive and opportunity allegations
64. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Novak, 216 F.3d at
307–08).
65. See Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4, at 4 (noting the difficulties experienced by
Second Circuit courts in discerning what constitutes a “concrete and personal
benefit”); Gibney, supra note 59, at 983–84 (stating that despite its admonitions
concerning motive and opportunity allegations, the Second Circuit retained its
pre-PSLRA pleading standard); Rossi, supra note 11, at 269–70 (stating that as of
2001 and 2002, the Second and Third Circuits had the most lenient pleading
standards).
66. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 978–79.
68. Id. at 975–77.
69. Id. at 977–79.
70. Id. at 979.
71. Id.
72. E.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); see Fla. State Bd. of
Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 653, 660 (8th Cir. 2001) (intimat-
ing that recklessness still satisfies the scienter requirement after the passage of
the PSLRA and finding that motive and opportunity allegations are sufficient to
plead scienter if such allegations give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not if
such allegations merely show motive and opportunity); Nathenson v. Zonagen
Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2001) (adopting the position articulated in In
re Comshare and Bryant without applying it to the circuit’s specific type of reck-
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inadequate, these circuits recognize that such allegations can contrib-
ute to pleading scienter and can potentially create a strong inference
of a defendant’s reckless or knowing state of mind.73  The Fourth, Sev-
enth, and Tenth Circuits joined these circuits in striking a middle
ground74 that highlights both the disparity in circuit opinions on the
adequacy of motive and opportunity allegations, and the holding by
the vast majority of circuits that such allegations, standing alone, are
insufficient to plead scienter.
Plaintiffs in circuits that eliminated or limited the applicability of
motive and opportunity allegations faced greater challenges than
their Second Circuit counterparts.  Proof of a defendant’s deliberate
recklessness will “almost always be in the [mind], or sometimes in the
files, of the [defendant],”75 meaning that Ninth Circuit plaintiffs at-
tempting to establish this mental state faced potential difficulties in
uncovering sufficient information to plead adequate allegations.76  Al-
though plaintiffs in other circuits could have used motive and opportu-
nity allegations to plead scienter,77 the ease with which such
allegations are discovered and alleged78 likely rendered them insuffi-
cient to show the types of recklessness that were probably as difficult
to uncover and allege as the Ninth Circuit’s similarly-defined “deliber-
ate recklessness.”79  To plead these forms of recklessness, plaintiffs
lessness); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that allegations of motive, standing alone, are insufficient to plead scienter,
although not stating that such allegations must show recklessness in order to be
adequate).
73. E.g., Fla. State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 660; Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 410–11;
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285–86; In re Comshare, 183 F.3d
at 551.
74. The Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have advised courts to examine the col-
lective allegations of the complaint in order to determine whether scienter had
been adequately pleaded and also found that allegations of motive and opportu-
nity could be relevant to establishing scienter. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic
Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2003); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos.,
264 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001).
75. Joseph T. Phillips, Comment, A New Pleading Standard Under the Private Secur-
ities Litigation Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 991 (2001).
76. See Weis, supra note 36, at 1774 (stating that plaintiffs often lack access to infor-
mation indicating circumstantial evidence of deliberate recklessness, due in part
to the fact that such information is often in the sole possession of the defendant
and this inaccessibility prevents plaintiffs from successfully alleging deliberate
recklessness); see also Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that the mo-
tive and opportunity test is the Second Circuit’s response to the impossibility that
it perceives in pleading a strong inference of scienter “without a smoking gun
reflecting a particular defendant’s innermost thoughts”).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 72–74.
78. See supra text accompanying note 59.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
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had to allege a higher degree of intent than a motive to defraud80 and
“a high level of culpability”81 without the benefit of a permissive inter-
pretive standard like that of the Second Circuit.82  Facing a under-
mining of Congress’s intent for a heightened, uniform pleading
standard by this disparity in plaintiff treatment and circuit views, the
Supreme Court formulated an interpretation that it believed would
effectuate Congress’ goal.
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court
sought to interpret the “strong inference” requirement in a manner
that would effectuate the goals of the PSLRA and resolve a circuit
split over the consideration of competing inferences.83  Investors ac-
cused Tellabs, Inc. and its current and former officers of misrepresent-
ing the true value of the company’s stock,84 and the Court addressed
“whether, and to what extent, a court must consider competing infer-
ences in determining whether a securities fraud complaint gives rise
to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.”85  Recognizing Congress’s intent to
create—through PSLRA’s heightened standard—both a uniform
pleading standard for, and a reduction in abuses of, private securities
fraud claims,86 the Court noted that “ ‘Congress did not throw much
light on what facts . . . suffice to create [a strong] inference,’ or on what
‘degree of imagination courts can use in divining whether’ the requi-
site inference exists.”87  As a result, the circuits had split over
whether courts should consider competing inferences in determining
the strength of an inference of scienter.88  To resolve this conflict, the
Court sought to offer an interpretation of the strong inference require-
ment that would advance “the PSLRA’s twin goals to curb frivolous,
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover
on meritorious claims.”89
80. See supra note 60.
81. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants at 17, In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (No.
97-16240), 1997 WL 33551249, at *17.
82. See id. (recognizing that all circuits employ the same recklessness standard and
stating that the “threshold for a finding of recklessness is quite high”).
83. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
84. Id. at 314–15.
85. Id. at 317–18.
86. Id. at 320–21.
87. Id. at 321–22 (quoting Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588,
601 (7th Cir. 2006)).
88. Id. at 322.
89. Id.
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To further these goals, the Court held that when deciding whether
plaintiffs have pleaded scienter at the motion to dismiss stage, a court
“must consider the complaint in its entirety”90 and “take into account
plausible opposing inferences”91 in order to determine if the inference
of scienter is “cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing infer-
ence of nonfraudulent intent” and therefore strong.92  The Court sum-
marized its standard in a question that it instructed reviewing courts
to ask: “When the allegations are accepted as true and taken collec-
tively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at
least as strong as any opposing inference?”93  It noted that this ques-
tion requires plaintiffs to “plead facts rendering an inference of scien-
ter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.”94
In its decision, the Supreme Court shed important light on the ade-
quacy of allegations of motive and opportunity.95  In refuting the con-
tention that a defendant’s lack of pecuniary motive is dispositive, the
Court found that “motive can be a relevant consideration . . . [but] the
absence of a motive allegation is not fatal”96 and that because “allega-
tions must be considered collectively[,] the significance that can be
ascribed to an allegation of motive, or lack thereof, depends on the
entirety of the complaint.”97  The potential relevancy of motive allega-
tions came after repeated calls for the Court’s guidance on the types of
allegations sufficient to plead scienter.98  It also offered crucial gui-
90. Id. at 322.
91. Id. at 323.
92. Id. at 314.
93. Id. at 326.
94. Id. at 326 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 325; see also Alan I. Raylesberg, Robert A. Schwinger & Robert Sidorsky,




that one of the key aspects of Tellabs is its handling of the individual sufficiency
of motive and opportunity allegations, which had divided the circuits); see also
Securities Litigation Update, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, 3 (June 26, 2007), http://www.
sidley.com/files/News/5e20a7bb-4d47-4af8-a063-011bd7ea41eb/Presentation/
NewsAttachment/f933eb1a-22e7-4fe8-bc11-04c00a94613e/Securities_Litigation_
Update_062607.pdf (stating that the Court’s finding that the absence of motive
allegations, when considered against the entire complaint, may be a relevant fac-
tor in evaluating scienter offers important guidance for future securities fraud
claims).
96. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325.
97. Id.
98. E.g., Briski, supra note 45, at 200 (calling on the Court to definitively rule on the
types of allegations sufficient to plead scienter in order to resolve the circuit
split); Jason L. Fowell, Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 Writ for Certiorari, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 809, 838 (2003) (“[I]t is time for the
Supreme Court to . . . shed some light on [the types of allegations sufficient to
plead scienter].”); Christopher J. Hardy, Comment, The PSLRA’s Heightened
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dance to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as it reconfigured its
scienter pleading standard.
III. THE POST-TELLABS SECOND CIRCUIT RESPONSE: ATSI
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V.  SHAAR FUND, LTD.
The Second Circuit issued its first post-Tellabs opinion, ATSI Com-
munications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,99 only twenty days after the
Tellabs decision.100  The plaintiff in ATSI, a telecommunications pro-
vider, accused its investors of engaging in misrepresentations and
market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
causing a “death spiral” in the price of the corporation’s stock by
fraudulently inducing the corporation to sell them its convertible
stock.101  At the same time, the defendants were allegedly aggres-
sively short-selling the corporation’s stock and covering their short po-
sitions through the sale of the corporation’s preferred stock.102  The
alleged end result was a drop in the price of the corporation’s stock
from $6 to $0.09 per share103 and large profits for the defendants.104
After it repeatedly failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, the plain-
tiff appealed to the Second Circuit,105 which provided the circuit with
its first opportunity to consider the appropriate scienter pleading
standard in light of the Tellabs decision.
In formulating its post-Tellabs scienter pleading standard, the
ATSI court incorporated the Second Circuit’s pre-Tellabs standard
and selectively adopted several Tellabs provisions.  The court began
its brief discussion by stating the overriding PSLRA requirement that
particularly-stated “facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
Pleading Standard: Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 U.S.F. L.
REV. 565, 592 (2001) (stating that the Supreme Court must promulgate a uniform
federal pleading standard for securities fraud actions in order to resolve the cir-
cuit split and effectuate the purpose of the PSLRA).
99. 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).
100. The Second Circuit decided ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. on July 11, 2007. Id. The Su-
preme Court decided Tellabs on June 21, 2007. Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.
101. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 93.  Convertible stock is a convertible security,
which is “[a] security . . . that may be exchanged by the owner for another secur-
ity, [especially] common stock from the same company, and [usually] at a fixed
price on a specified date.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (9th ed. 2009).  For an
excellent hypothetical describing how the “death spiral” process works, see At
Death’s Door, STOCKPATROL.COM (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www.stockpatrol.com/ar-
ticle/key/deathspiral.
102. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 93.  Preferred stock is “[a] class of stock giving
its holder a preferential claim to dividends and to corporate assets upon liquida-
tion but that [usually] carries no voting rights.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1553
(9th ed. 2009).
103. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 97.
104. Id. at 93.
105. Id. at 98.
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fendant acted with the required state of mind” must be pleaded for
each alleged violation.106  Next, the court summarily affirmed the Sec-
ond Circuit’s pre-Tellabs case law by finding that allegations “(1)
showing that the defendants had both motive and opportunity to com-
mit the fraud or (2) constituting strong circumstantial evidence of con-
scious misbehavior or recklessness” are, without qualification,
adequate to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.107  The court
also adopted the Tellabs prescriptions that a court reviewing a com-
plaint must consider opposing, innocent inferences and that an infer-
ence of scienter is only strong if it is cogent and at least as compelling
as any opposing inference.108  However, the court failed to mention
the Tellabs requirement that the collective allegations serve as the
basis for determining the successful pleading of such an inference of
scienter and the significance of the presence or absence of an allega-
tion of motive.109
Proceeding under the newly-established standard, the court found
that none of the complaint’s allegations gave rise to a strong inference
of scienter.110  The allegation that convertible preferred stock—a le-
gitimate investment vehicle—created an opportunity for profit
through manipulation was insufficient to raise a strong inference of
scienter.111  After finding that the defendants failed to provide suffi-
cient particular facts to give rise to a strong inference of scienter,112
the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint and denial of leave to amend.113  Despite the actual holding, the
most significant aspect of the case—because it raised issues that in-
volve the Supreme Court, Congress, and other circuits—was the
court’s affirmation that allegations of motive and opportunity, con-
scious misbehavior, or recklessness are, without qualification, suffi-
cient to plead a strong inference of scienter,114 even after the Tellabs
Court’s finding that such allegations may be relevant to such a
pleading.115
IV. ANALYSIS
In prescribing the review process that courts must conduct upon a
motion to dismiss, the Tellabs Court established, and the ATSI stan-
dard contradicts, specific requirements for pleading scienter.  The





111. Id. at 104.
112. Id. at 104–05.
113. Id. at 108.
114. Id. at 99.
115. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007).
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Court’s instruction to lower courts to consider the complaint’s collec-
tive allegations and competing inferences and look for an equally com-
pelling inference in determining whether plaintiffs plead scienter
mandates that plaintiffs utilize the collective allegations to show such
an equally compelling inference.116  Therefore, the Court’s finding
that motive allegations, although relevant, must be considered within
the framework of the collective allegations carries a clear pleading im-
plication: individual allegations of motive and opportunity or con-
scious misbehavior or recklessness, if part of the collective allegations
that demonstrate an equally compelling inference, can contribute to
pleading a strong inference of scienter, but alone are inadequate.117
The ATSI standard, however, allows such allegations to indepen-
dently suffice,118 which contradicts the Tellabs Court’s pleading posi-
tion119 and undermines its review process;120 defies the intent of the
Supreme Court;121 has contributed to a wide circuit split;122 and has
created the need for Supreme Court intervention.123
116. See id. at 323–24, 328 (stating that in order for the complaint to survive, a court
must find that the inference of scienter is as compelling as the opposing inference
and that “[a] plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action . . . must plead facts ren-
dering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing infer-
ence” (emphasis in original)); E. Powell Miller, The Supreme Court’s Decision in
Tellabs: The Death Knell for Securities Fraud Class Actions? Not so Fast, 86
MICH. B. J. 40, 42 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/
pdf4article1230.pdf (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328) (stating that while Tellabs
requires courts to weigh facts, a plaintiff’s pleading burden only demands that
“the weight of the factual allegations . . . be ‘as likely as’ any inferences that the
defendant acted with a non-fraudulent intent”); Raylesberg, Schwinger & Sidor-
sky, supra note 95, at 2, 5 (stating that prior to Tellabs, the Second and Third
Circuits allowed plaintiffs to plead scienter from individual allegations and not-
ing that the Tellabs Court’s instruction to courts to consider the collective allega-
tions imposes a greater burden on plaintiffs than they had previously faced in
such circuits).
117. See Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 (3d Cir. 2009)
(adopting Tellabs’s prescription to consider allegations of motive and opportunity
with the collective allegations in assessing whether a plaintiff has pleaded scien-
ter); SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, Third Circuit Applies Tellabs
to Reject Motive and Opportunity Test in Favor of a “Holistic Approach” to Plead-
ing Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions, CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (June 18, 2009),
http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/securities-litigation-third-circuit-ap-
plies-tellabs-to-reject-motive-and-opportunity-test-in-favor-of-a-holistic-ap-
proach-to-pleading-scienter-in-securities-fraud-actions.html (stating that the
Avaya court found that “allegations of motive and opportunity, standing alone,
were insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter” but could contribute to
such an inference “when accompanied by other . . . facts”).
118. Infra section IV.A.
119. Infra section IV.A.
120. Infra section IV.B.
121. Infra section IV.C.
122. Infra section IV.D.
123. Infra section IV.E.
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A. The ATSI standard conflicts with Tellabs by allowing
plaintiffs to plead scienter through individual
allegations
The scienter pleading standard established in ATSI and currently
employed in the Second Circuit allows plaintiffs to plead scienter us-
ing individual allegations of motive and opportunity, conscious misbe-
havior, or recklessness.124  This position arises from the ATSI court’s
finding that these allegations are, without qualification, adequate to
plead scienter, and its failure to adopt the Tellabs caveat that the col-
lective allegations must serve as the basis for evaluating an inference
of scienter and the significance of the presence or absence of motive
allegations.125  This is in direct contravention of Tellabs.  While the
Second Circuit has since adopted Tellabs’s prescription to consider the
collective allegations in determining whether a strong inference of sci-
enter exists,126 it continues to allow the unqualified sufficiency of in-
dividual allegations, and has failed to adopt the caveat cautioning
similar collective evaluation of motive allegations.127  This condition,
if included, would have demonstrated both the insufficiency of individ-
ual allegations and that scienter may only be pleaded from collective
allegations.128  Instead, this standard, based upon its text, still ap-
124. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007).
125. Id.  Prior to Tellabs, the Second Circuit required that allegations of motive show
“a concrete and personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from the
fraud.”  Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).  However, this re-
quirement is also absent from the ATSI court’s decision. ATSI Commc’ns, 493
F.3d at 99.
126. E.g., Condra v. PXRE Grp. Ltd., No. 09-1370-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27949, at
*3–4 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2009); State Univs Ret. Sys. v. Astrazeneca PLC, No. 08-
3185-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13674, at *2 (2d Cir. June 25, 2009); Malin v. XL
Capital, Ltd., No. 07-3749-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4984, at *4 (Mar. 5, 2009)
(noting that Tellabs requires consideration of the collective allegations).
127. E.g., Condra, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27949, at *3–4; W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v.
Doral Fin. Corp., No. 08-3867-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19954, at *3–4 (2d Cir.
Sept. 3, 2009); State Univs. Ret. Sys., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13674, at *2–4.
128. This caveat would have acted as a “tiebreaker” of sorts between the conflicting
aspects of the standard.  Language stating that plaintiffs can plead scienter
through individual allegations and instructing courts to consider the collective
allegations in evaluating whether a plaintiff has pleaded scienter would suggest
that individual or collective allegations can serve as the basis for pleading scien-
ter.  However, a prescription telling courts that the significance of individual mo-
tive allegations—and by implication, individual allegations of all types—in
pleading scienter can only be discerned from reference to the complaint’s collec-
tive allegations sends the message that such collective allegations are the only
basis for pleading scienter, because the question of whether a plaintiff has
pleaded scienter can only be answered by reference to such collective allegations,
and not the individual allegations. See Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4, at 2 (ar-
guing that the Tellabs Court, through this caveat, implicitly rejected the motive
and opportunity test).
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pears to allow plaintiffs to plead scienter through such individual alle-
gations.  This directly conflicts with Tellabs.129
Although neighboring circuits and practitioners may share a com-
mon perception that plaintiffs can plead scienter through individual
allegations in the Second Circuit, circuit case law suggests that it has
become legally-sanctioned reality.  For example, the Third Circuit
found that “allegations of motive and opportunity are not entitled to a
special, independent status . . . [and] are to be considered along with
all the other allegations in the complaint,”130 and noted that “[t]he
Second Circuit has continued to treat motive and opportunity allega-
tions as a separate category, but it does not appear to have explicitly
examined whether that practice is consistent with Tellabs.”131
Thomas O. Gorman, Chair of the SEC and Securities Litigation Group
at Porter Wright Morris & Arthur,132 has noted that the ATSI court
utilized the circuit’s prior motive and opportunity test to craft a plead-
ing standard that is arguably inconsistent with Tellabs.133 Similarly,
attorneys with Morgan Lewis—which handles securities fraud de-
fense cases134—agree that the Second Circuit continues to use this
test, which offers “an independent route to [pleading] scienter.”135
Further, post-ATSI Second Circuit opinions suggest that plaintiffs are
actually pleading scienter using only these individual allegations,136
129. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007)
(citing Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 431 (5th Cir. 2002)) (holding
that the determination of whether a plaintiff has pleaded a strong inference of
scienter depends on “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise
to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scruti-
nized in isolation, meets that standard”); see also Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4,
at 2 (stating that because the motive and opportunity test allows for a finding of a
strong inference of scienter based on only two types of facts, no matter what else
is alleged, it is inconsistent with Tellabs).
130. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 (3d Cir. 2009).
131. Id. at 277 n.51.
132. Thomas O. Gorman, Tellabs and Pleading a Strong Inference of Scienter: Is a
New Split Emerging Over Its Application In Private Securities Litigation?,
CELESQ ATTORNEYSED CENTER, 1 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.secactions.com/arti-
cles/tell/Article4.pdf.
133. Id. at 26–27 (stating that the ATSI court held that scienter can be pleaded using
the Second Circuit’s pre-Tellabs test and arguing that, to the extent the test al-
lows plaintiffs to rely solely on allegations of motive and opportunity to plead
scienter, it is inconsistent with Tellabs).
134. Brian Herman et. al., 2009 Year In Review: Selected Federal Securities Litigation
Developments, MORGAN LEWIS, 4 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.morganlewis.com/
pubs/SecuritiesLF_2009SecLitDev_28jan10.pdf.
135. Id. at 2.
136. See, e.g., In re CIT Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 6613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57467, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010) (declining to evaluate allegations of
motive after finding allegations of recklessness sufficient to establish a strong
inference of scienter); Citiline Holdings, Inc. v. iStar Fin., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 3612
(RJS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29706, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (finding that
the plaintiff had pleaded scienter based upon the plaintiff’s allegations of motive
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which hinders any argument that the standard is merely ambiguous,
rather than contrary to Tellabs.  This points to one conclusion: the
standard articulated in ATSI and currently in effect in the Second Cir-
cuit allows plaintiffs to plead scienter using individual allegations, in
contravention of Tellabs.
B. The ATSI standard prevents full use of the Tellabs
review process
Permitting plaintiffs to plead scienter through individual allega-
tions, as the Second Circuit does,137 encourages courts ruling on mo-
tions to dismiss to base their holdings on the presence or absence of
such allegations and conduct abbreviated Tellabs analyses.138  The
circuit’s position that the mere presence of such allegations is suffi-
cient to plead scienter encourages courts, when these allegations are
present, to summarily proclaim that a plaintiff has pleaded a strong
inference of scienter without considering the collective allegations or
comparing the competing inferences.139  Further, courts in the Second
and opportunity and strong circumstantial evidence of misbehavior and reckless-
ness without discussing the complaint’s collective allegations); Cornwell v. Credit
Suisse Grp., 08 Civ. 3758 (VM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927, at *16–22
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010) (after finding that that the plaintiff had not sufficiently
alleged motive and opportunity, the court found that the plaintiff had pleaded
scienter through allegations of recklessness without discussing the complaint’s
collective allegations); Billhofer v. Flamel Techs. SA., no. 1:07-cv-09920 (CSH),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97287, at *29–31, 36 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009) (failing to find
scienter through allegations of motive and opportunity, and concluding, without
discussing the complaint’s collective allegations, that the plaintiff had pleaded
scienter based upon allegations constituting strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness); Gildepath Holding B.V. v. Spherlon
Corp., No. 04 Civ 9758 (KMK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54889, at *43 (S.D.N.Y.
July 25, 2007) (stating there was no need to evaluate allegations of conscious
misbehavior after finding allegations of motive and opportunity sufficient to es-
tablish a strong inference of scienter, although later analyzing allegations of con-
scious misbehavior).
137. Supra section IV.A.
138. Prior to Tellabs, the Second Circuit test allowed courts to “[focus] discretely on
the presence or absence of . . . particular kinds of allegations” in evaluating
whether scienter had been pleaded.  Raylesberg, Schwinger & Sidorsky, supra
note 95, at 5.  Because this is also the Second Circuit’s post-Tellabs standard,
courts are still allowed to do this.
139. See Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4 (stating that under the Second Circuit test,
the requisite strong inference is shown so long as plaintiffs allege motive and
opportunity or conscious misbehavior or recklessness, and arguing that this “mo-
tive and opportunity test” conflicts with the Tellabs dismissal review provisions
because it “isolat[es] two categories of factual allegations to the exclusion of all
others and thereby ignor[es] the plaintiff’s inability to plead any other types of
allegations” and thus does not holistically or comparatively consider all the facts
and all the inferences from those facts); see also Institutional Investors Grp. v.
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 n.51 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that, because the non-
culpable inference is not always less compelling than the inference of scienter
2012] GROUNDING THE SHORT CIRCUIT 259
Circuit may believe that plaintiffs can only plead scienter through
these allegations and thus may conclude, without conducting a full
analysis, that the innocent inference is more plausible and scienter is
lacking when such allegations are deficient or absent.  The court
seemingly demonstrated this result in Malin v. XL Capital Limited,140
in which the court affirmed a lower court’s finding of a lack of scienter
and its decision not to examine the complaint’s entire allegations after
it found the motive and recklessness allegations insufficient.141  In
other recent Second Circuit cases, courts found and failed to find
strong inferences of scienter after focusing only on the presence or ab-
sence of individual allegations.142  Thus, the divergence of the ATSI
pleading standard from the Tellabs pleading provisions has en-
couraged Second Circuit courts to forego most of the Supreme Court’s
dismissal review process.
Short-circuited analyses also create the potential for a finding that
scienter has been pleaded in situations where the plaintiff’s inference
is not actually as cogent or compelling as the non-culpable inference,
which is a result that conflicts with Tellabs.  The Second Circuit has
been willing to use weak assertions to find that motive and opportu-
nity, which “are not particularly probative of [fraudulent] intent,”143
have been sufficiently alleged.144  This willingness increases the like-
suggested by allegations of motive and opportunity, such allegations, contrary to
the Second Circuit’s position, are not an independent route to establishing scien-
ter); Securities Litigation Update, supra note 95, at 3 (stating that in order to
comply with Tellabs, the Second Circuit will have to abandon its pre-Tellabs
“strong inference” approach, under which motive and opportunity allegations
were analyzed separately and alone could suffice to show scienter).
140. No. 07-3749-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4984 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2009).
141. Id. at 3–4.
142. Some courts have found a strong inference of scienter upon review of only the
plaintiff’s allegations of motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or reck-
lessness.  In re CIT Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 6613, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57467, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010); The Pa. Ave. Funds v. Inyx, Inc., No.
08 Civ. 6857 (PKC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19177, at *34–38 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
2010); Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 596,
607–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In Re Tommy Hilfiger, Sec. Litig., 04-cv-7678, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55088, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007).  Other courts have found
scienter lacking based only upon review of deficient forms of such allegations and
the correspondingly insufficient inferences of fraudulent intent raised by these
allegations.  Ashland, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 453,
468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d, 652 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (conscious recklessness
analysis only); Trinity Bui. v. Indus. Enters. of Am., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 364,
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Garber v. Legg Mason, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 597, 615–17
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
143. Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4; see also Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 655 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[H]aving the motive and opportu-
nity to do wrong are certainly not the same as having the intent to do it.”).
144. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing SEC
v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996)) (“The Second Circuit
has been lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judgment
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lihood that a court may find that scienter has been pleaded, which it
can do once it establishes the presence of such allegations, when in
fact the opposing, unexamined inference is actually more cogent and
compelling.  Further, these factors, coupled with the strong presence
in the Second Circuit of claims predicated upon such allegations,145
make the advancement of less plausible inferences of scienter, which
is counter to Tellabs,146 an even stronger possibility.
C. ATSI conflicts with the Supreme Court’s intent to create
a heightened, uniform scienter pleading standard
capable of reducing frivolous litigation
The Tellabs Court sought to formulate a heightened, uniform sci-
enter pleading standard in order to facilitate the PSLRA’s twin goals
of reducing frivolous litigation and keeping courts open to meritorious
suits.147  Because Congress chose the PSLRA’s heightened, uniform
pleading standard as the mechanism to effectuate these goals,148 the
Court’s desire to interpret the standard in a manner that would effec-
tuate these goals149 demonstrated its intent to formulate such a
heightened, uniform standard to bring about these goals.150
Presented with the task of resolving a circuit split over whether com-
peting inferences should be considered in evaluating the pleading of
scienter,151 the Court sought to create this standard through the pro-
based on fairly tenuous inferences.”); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 270–71 (2d Cir. 1993).
145. Since the ATSI decision, 147 securities fraud claims arising from Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 have been filed in the Second Circuit.  Because the standard al-
lows motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or recklessness allega-
tions, it can be presumed that most if not all of these complaints contain
allegations of these mental states.  Cornerstone Research and Stanford Law
School provided this data concerning the number of case filings to the author.
The author would like to thank both parties for their generous contribution.  The
views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not represent in
any way the views of Cornerstone Research or Stanford Law School.
146. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
147. Id. at 322.
148. Supra text accompanying note 36.
149. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.
150. The Court acknowledged that Congress sought to create “a uniform pleading
standard for §10(b) actions” in enacting the PSLRA and that it designed the bill’s
“heightened pleading requirements” to reduce frivolous litigation. Id. at 320–21.
Thus, the later expression of the Court’s desire to interpret the “strong inference”
requirement in a manner that would effectuate the litigation changes sought
through the enactment of the PSLRA, id. at 322, indicates the Court’s intent to
provide a uniform, heightened interpretation of the scienter pleading standard to
accomplish these changes.
151. Id. at 317–18.
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mulgation of consistent, strong review provisions152 and correspond-
ing pleading requirements.153
Through its review and pleading prescriptions, the Supreme Court
advanced its goal of a heightened, uniform scienter pleading standard
capable of reducing frivolous litigation and allowing the advancement
of meritorious claims.  By mandating the consideration of all allega-
tions, examination and comparison of the competing mental infer-
ences and a finding that the scienter inference is at least as
compelling as the opposing inference, the Court promulgated a consis-
tent, strong review process, as these conditions require courts to both
conduct more thorough analyses and demand stronger showings of
plausibility at the dismissal stage than they previously had.154  By
152. The Court stated its aim to interpret the “strong inference” standard to effectuate
the goals of the PSLRA in its discussion of the circuit split over the proper dismis-
sal review process, id. at 322, which it had expressed a desire to resolve, id. at
317–18.  This indicates the Court’s decision to further this goal of a uniform,
heightened pleading standard by promulgating strong, consistent review process
prescriptions. See also John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 637 (2008) (stating
that the Tellabs Court laid out its review process provisions while keeping in
mind Congress’s desire to create a uniform standard to reduce frivolous
litigation).
153. The Supreme Court instructed courts to only allow a complaint to survive dismis-
sal if its inference of scienter is at least as compelling as the opposing inference,
and thus strong and not simply reasonable. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323–24.  The
Court’s later incorporation of this heightened “equally plausible” condition into
its pleading requirements, id. at 328, coupled with its overriding desire to provide
a raised standard, supra text accompanying note 148, indicates that the former
was done to effectuate the latter. See also James B. Fipp, Note, Securities Law—
How Strong is Strong Enough?: The Tellabs Court Lacked the Needed Strength
for Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007), 8 WYO. L. REV. 629, 641–42 (2008) (stating that the
Tellabs Court considered the Seventh Circuit standard and the greater strength
that Congress sought in the “strong inference” requirement against Congress’s
desire to achieve a heightened pleading standard before finding that plaintiffs
were required to plead a cogent inference of scienter).
154. The Second and Third Circuits allowed courts to find scienter based on individual
allegations of motive and opportunity and did not require consideration of a com-
plaint’s collective allegations. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529
(2d Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir.
1999).  Additionally, the pre-Tellabs Seventh Circuit review process did not re-
quire consideration or comparison of the competing inferences.  Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006). Tellabs therefore
obligates these circuits to conduct a more rigorous analytical process. The Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits did not require that the inference of scienter be as com-
pelling as the non-culpable inference. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d
at 602 (allowing a finding that scienter had been pleaded if “a reasonable person
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent”); Pirraglia v.
Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (“If a plaintiff pleads facts with
particularity that, in the overall context of the pleadings . . . give rise to a strong
inference of scienter, the scienter requirement . . . is satisfied.”).  Thus, Tellabs
imposes stronger requirements than these circuits had previously employed. See
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also imposing the substance of these review conditions on plaintiffs,155
the Supreme Court brought stringency to the pleading criteria for
these types of claims, as plaintiffs seeking to plead scienter must
match an opposing inference156 that may be stronger than their infer-
ence of the defendant’s fraudulent intent.157  They must do so using
the complaint’s entire allegations, which forces them to utilize a
broader base of assertions to demonstrate scienter, which may be
more difficult than relying on only a few allegations.158  These rigor-
ous review and pleading requirements pose a challenge to frivolous,
but not meritorious, claims,159 and are thus capable of prompting the
also Securities Litigation Update, supra note 95, at 3 (arguing that Tellabs en-
courages lower courts to “approach allegations of scienter . . . with a degree of
close scrutiny that is virtually unparalleled at the pleading stage”).
155. See supra text accompanying note 116.
156. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 328.
157. E.g., Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2009) (comparing two in-
ferences—(1) the defendant knew that backdated options had caused overstated
earnings and (2) the defendant was unaware of the effect of such options—and
finding the latter more compelling); ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512
F.3d 46, 65–67 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding the inference that the defendants misrep-
resented school’s budget less compelling than opposing, non-culpable inference);
Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that plain-
tiffs’ allegations of defendants frequent patent litigation equally, or perhaps more
likely, indicate the defendants’ non-fraudulent intent); Ronconi v. Larkin, 253
F.3d 423, 432–33 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that defendants’ statement that quar-
terly earnings were less than expected due to its consolidation with another en-
tity only indicates that the consolidation had not occurred as rapidly as expected,
not that the defendants had acted with scienter); see also Institutional Investors
Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It cannot be said that, in
every conceivable situation in which an individual makes a false or misleading
statement and has a strong motive and opportunity to do so, the nonculpable
explanations will necessarily not be more compelling than the culpable ones.”);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 524–25
(describing the competing inferences that specific types of allegations may give
rise to).
158. See Raylesberg, Schwinger & Sidorsky, supra note 95, at 5 (noting the require-
ment that courts consider the collective allegations and intimating that plaintiffs,
such as those in the Second Circuit, will face a greater challenge in pleading sci-
enter based upon the complaint’s collective allegations, rather than based upon
individual allegations); see also Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529,
538 (2d Cir. 1999) (arguing that to require more than bare allegations of motive
and opportunity would, absent overwhelming evidence of fraud, make pleading
scienter virtually impossible).
159. See Client Alert: Supreme Court Raises Pleading Bar for Securities Fraud Law-
suits, LEVENFELD PEARLSTEIN, LLC (July 2007), http://www.lplegal.com/sec_data
point_062907/ (describing the “equally-compelling” requirement and stating that
“facially meritorious claims will survive under this standard”); Interview with
Patrick O. Hunnius, Partner, White & Case (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.whitecase.com/talking_10012007/ (reciting Tellabs’s “equally-compelling”
pleading requirement and noting that this ruling will “[deter] the filing of merit-
less actions”); John B. Missing, Jonathan R. Tuttle, Colby A. Smith & Ada Fer-
nandez Johnson, Raising the Bar: Supreme Court Clarifies Scienter Pleading
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litigation changes that Congress sought.  Also, because the nation’s
highest court made them for lower court adoption, these promulga-
tions advance the goal of uniformity in the review process and plead-
ing requirements.
The Second Circuit’s pleading requirements and dismissal review
process directly conflict with the Tellabs Court’s goal of a uniform,
heightened scienter pleading standard capable of reducing frivolous
claims.  Instead of facing the challenge of pleading a strong inference
of scienter from the complaint’s collective allegations,160 Second Cir-
cuit plaintiffs can plead scienter using only individual allegations of
motive and opportunity,161 which can be discovered and pleaded with
ease.162  In addition to allowing this type of pleading, the courts of the
Second Circuit have adopted an abbreviated dismissal review process.
They do not scrutinze the mere presence or absence of such allegations
is dispositive to a court’s scienter decision, the collective allegations,
or competing inferences nor do they demand a showing of equal plau-
sibility.163  By allowing a plaintiff to satisfy the plaintiff’s pleading
obligations and avoid dismissal through the mere pleading of allega-
tions of motive and opportunity, the Second Circuit imposes conditions
that meritless claims can likely meet164 in place of requirements that




ForFederalSecuri.pdf (stating that Tellabs should make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to “pursue cases where the alleged fraudulent scheme is implausible”
and “to bring cases whose allegations paint a picture of economically irrational
conduct”); Miller, supra note 116, at 42 (stating that the Tellabs balancing test
will allow meritorious claims to be brought); Raylesberg, supra note 95, at 5 (stat-
ing that Tellabs will prompt “even more rigorous and intensive scrutiny of the
factual allegations in securities fraud complaints, with more such complaints be-
ing dismissed at an early pre-discovery stage as a result”); Securities Litigation
Update, supra note 95, at 3 (arguing that the Tellabs comparative analysis
“should prove of considerable assistance to defendants faced with claims of dubi-
ous merit”); see also Peter Lattman, Tellabs: Securities Lawyers React, WALL ST.
J. L BLOG (June 21, 2007, 1:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/21/tellabs-
securities-lawyers-react/ (quoting Stan Bernstein, who submitted an amicus brief
for the plaintiffs in Tellabs, as stating that the decision is a balance between
preserving the ability to recover on meritorious suits and reducing frivolous
litigation).
160. See supra text accompanying note 156.
161. Supra section IV.A.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 58–62.
163. Supra section IV.B.
164. Pleading allegations of motive and opportunity in the Second Circuit is not highly
challenging in part because securities fraud defendants are frequently presented
with the motive and opportunity to defraud and the circuit has previously em-
ployed a plaintiff-friendly interpretation that allows even weak allegations to suf-
fice. Supra text accompanying note 56–60.  Frivolous claims are likely able to
capitalize upon this permissiveness and successfully plead such allegations, as
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were capable of reducing such suits.165  These measures are unique to
the Second Circuit,166 which reduces hope for uniformity in the review
process and pleading requirements.  Thus, it appears that current
Second Circuit practices present no opportunity for the fulfillment of
the Supreme Court’s goal of a heightened, uniform scienter pleading
standard capable of reducing frivolous litigation.
D. The ATSI decision ensured a circuit split and provided a
guide for the renewal of the wide split over motive
and opportunity allegations
After ATSI, the other circuits developed their respective post-Tel-
labs standards by adopting the Supreme Court’s provisions and af-
firming their prior scienter definitions.  In August 2007, the Fifth
Circuit—in its first post-Tellabs decision167—adopted Tellabs’s pre-
scription that a strong inference of scienter must be at least as com-
pelling as the opposing inference168 and based upon the entire
complaint.169  The circuit also affirmed its pre-Tellabs holding that
scienter constitutes “intent or severe recklessness.”170  During 2008
and 2009, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits adopted Tellabs and affirmed that plaintiffs can show
scienter through a form of recklessness.171  With the Second Circuit
also affirming that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement,172
the circuits again agree on this issue.
commentators have noted that these weak attributes prevent the “motive and
opportunity” test from deterring or eliminating such claims. See Briski, supra
note 45, at 200 n.357; Gibney, supra note 59, at 1013.
165. Supra section IV.A.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 173–80.
167. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 546 (5th
Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 551.
169. Id. at 552.
170. Id. at 551 (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001)).
171. E.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267–68 (3d Cir.
2009); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating that plaintiffs must establish “a strong inference of deliberate reckless-
ness”); Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2008);
Frank v. Dana Corp., 547 F.3d 564, 570–71 (6th Cir. 2008); Ley v. Visteon Corp.,
543 F.3d 801, 809 (6th Cir. 2008); Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618,
623–24 (4th Cir. 2008); Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 2008);
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2008);
ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2008).
172. E.g., One Communs. Corp. v. JP Morgan SBIC LLC, Nos. 09-1815-cv, 09-2324-cv,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12386, at *4–5 (2d Cir. June 17, 2010); Campo v. Sears
Holding Corp., No. 09-3589-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7043, at *4 (2d Cir. Apr. 6,
2010); W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v. Doral Fin. Corp., No. 08-3867-cv, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19954, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 2009); ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Despite their unanimity on one issue, the circuits have again di-
verged over the sufficiency of motive and opportunity allegations.  In
Cornelia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc.,173 the Eighth Cir-
cuit retreated from its prior position to find that allegations of motive
and opportunity are, without qualification, adequate to plead scien-
ter.174  The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits ap-
peared to retreat from their pre-Tellabs positions that such
allegations can be relevant175 by failing to affirm both those positions
and the Tellabs provision concerning the potential relevancy of motive
allegations.176  However, the Ninth Circuit retained its pre-Tellabs
position that such allegations do not satisfy the scienter require-
ment,177 while the Sixth and Third Circuits both found that these al-
legations may be relevant.178  The Sixth Circuit came to this finding
by retaining its pre-Tellabs position,179 and the Third Circuit did so by
incorporating Tellabs.180  The result is that all the circuits other than
the Eighth Circuit disagree with the Second Circuit’s position on the
sufficiency of motive and opportunity allegations,181 with the majority
of the circuits opposed to an even greater degree than they were prior
to Tellabs.182
173. 519 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2008).
174. Id. at 782.  Prior to Tellabs, the Eighth Circuit found that motive and opportunity
allegations could establish a strong inference of scienter, but also found that cer-
tain types of motives would be insufficient to do so. See, e.g., In re K-tel Intern.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 894 (8th Cir. 2002).  However, the court in Cornelia
stated that such allegations are, without qualification, sufficient to plead scien-
ter.  519 F.3d at 782.
175. For a description of these positions, see supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
176. E.g., Mizzaro, 554 F.3d at 1238–39; Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 623–24; Makor Issues,
513 F.3d at 705; ACA Fin., 512 F.3d at 58–59; Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v.
Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 551–52 (5th Cir. 2007).
177. E.g., Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).
178. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 (3d Cir. 2009); Ley
v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 813 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Comshare Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999)).  Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third
Circuit does not find that allegations showing only motive and opportunity are
insufficient to plead scienter, but suggests that such allegations may be relevant.
Compare Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 277, with Ley, 543 F.3d at 813.
Thus, while both circuits potentially allow the use of such allegations, their re-
spective positions on the adequacy of such allegations differ.
179. Ley, 543 F.3d at 813.
180. Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 277.
181. Compare ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)
(stating that motive and opportunity allegations satisfy the “strong inference” re-
quirement), with supra text accompanying notes 171–178.
182. Prior to Tellabs, eight of the eleven circuits held the position that motive and
opportunity allegations could be relevant to pleading a strong inference of scien-
ter. Supra text accompanying notes 73–74.  The Second Circuit found that such
allegations were, without qualification, sufficient to plead scienter. E.g., Press v.
Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537–38 (2d Cir. 1999).  Viewing the cir-
cuits’ respective positions on this issue as a continuum, there was a definite dif-
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As the first circuit to promulgate its post-Tellabs pleading require-
ments, the Second Circuit could have, at a minimum, avoided contrib-
uting to the circuit split.  The circuit would have had no culpability in
the split if it had simply incorporated the Tellabs Court’s caveat con-
cerning motive allegations, as under these circumstances the eight re-
maining circuits that adopted positions contrary to the Second
Circuit’s183 would have been solely responsible for the split.  This
would have represented a positive step toward resolving the dispute
over these allegations, as the primary court on one extreme of the de-
bate would have adopted a moderate position184 and placed pressure
on the Ninth Circuit, the circuit occupying the other extreme,185 to
issue a similar holding.  Such a decision could also have prompted the
Eighth Circuit to avoid adopting the motive and opportunity test,186
and would have provided a model standard that, if imitated, would
have facilitated consistent pleading standards across the circuits.187
ference in opinion between these “maybe-motive” circuits and the extreme of the
“yes-motive” Second Circuit.  However, five of these circuits joined the Ninth Cir-
cuit in adopting the “no-motive” stance after Tellabs, supra text accompanying
notes 173–75, and the Second Circuit retained its “yes-motive” stance, see, e.g.,
ATSI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 99, resulting in a greater divergence in opinion
between the majority of the circuits and the Second Circuit than had been the
case prior to Tellabs.
183. See supra notes 173–77 for a discussion of these positions.  The Sixth Circuit is
among these eight circuits because, although it finds that allegations of motive
and opportunity may be relevant to pleading scienter, it only considers such alle-
gations sufficient if “those facts . . . simultaneously establish that the defendant
acted recklessly or knowingly.” In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,
551 (6th Cir. 1999). Tellabs holds that such allegations may be relevant to plead-
ing scienter and does not require the showing of a specific type of mind for that
conclusion to be reached. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 325 (2007).
184. For a discussion of the circuits’ respective pre-Tellabs positions on the adequacy
of motive and opportunity allegations, see supra section II.B.
185. Supra section II.B.
186. While the Eighth Circuit gave no indication that the Second Circuit influenced its
finding that individual allegations of motive and opportunity are sufficient to
plead scienter, Cornelia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778,
782 (8th Cir. 2008), it had previously followed the Second Circuit’s findings con-
cerning the sufficiency of such allegations. In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300
F.3d 881, 894 (8th Cir. 2002).  Thus, it is possible that the Eighth Circuit consid-
ered the Second Circuit’s position on these allegations.
187. The Eighth and Third Circuits considered the Second Circuit’s stance on the ade-
quacy of motive and opportunity allegations when formulating their own posi-
tions on the issue.  Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242 (3d
Cir. 2009); In re K-tel Int’l, 300 F.3d 881.  Notably, this was not done in the con-
text of attempting to discern Congress’s intent in enacting the PSLRA. Institu-
tional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 277; In re K-tel Int’l, 300 F.3d at 894.  The
willingness of these circuits to refer to the Second Circuit’s position when formu-
lating their own opinions indicates that the Second Circuit’s stance carried
weight with these circuits and could have conceivably been imitated by these and
other circuits.
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Instead, the ATSI court promulgated a standard that ensured a
circuit split, regardless of the subsequent pleading standards created
by the other circuits, and provided a guide for the renewal of the sig-
nificant pre-Tellabs split.  The court’s finding that motive and oppor-
tunity allegations are, without qualification, sufficient guaranteed a
division with another circuit, like the Sixth, that also affirmed its
prior case law,188 as the Second Circuit’s pre-Tellabs position differed
from the stances of nearly every circuit.189  The court’s failure to in-
clude the Tellabs prescription to consider these allegations within the
collective allegations ensured a split with a circuit, like the Third, that
adopted this caveat,190 and as seen, ATSI conflicts with the standards
that actually emerged.191  Further, other circuits should not have
adopted the ATSI standard simply because it was the first post-Tel-
labs standard, as the ATSI court’s failure to explain its affirmation of
its motive and opportunity test192 offered no basis upon which other
circuits could have justified their adoption of a position contrary to
their own pre-Tellabs stances.193 ATSI also provided a guide for the
renewal of the significant pre-Tellabs split, as the court’s failure to
adopt the Tellabs caveat and its affirmation of the Second Circuit’s
prior position on these allegations demonstrated how to craft a stan-
dard from these tenets.  The Ninth Circuit followed this script in form-
ing its post-Tellabs scienter pleading standard from its pre-Tellabs
finding that motive and opportunity allegations are inadequate,194
188. After Tellabs, the Sixth Circuit affirmed its prior holding that allegations show-
ing only motive and opportunity are insufficient to plead a strong inference of
scienter, but those that give rise to a strong inference of reckless behavior are
adequate to satisfy this requirement.  Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 809
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550).  Because the Second
Circuit has retained its pre-Tellabs position that such allegations are, without
qualification, sufficient to plead scienter, see, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007), a split exists between the circuits.
189. Supra section II.B.
190. See SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, supra note 117 (stating that the
Third Circuit, in holding in accordance with Tellabs that motive and opportunity
allegations can contribute to pleading scienter, split with the Second Circuit,
which continues to find that such allegations are sufficient to do so).
191. Supra text accompanying note 179.
192. ATSI Commc’ns, 493 F.3d at 99.
193. For a description of the circuits’ respective pre-Tellabs positions, see supra sec-
tion II.B.
194. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).  Al-
though the Zucco court affirmed its pre-Tellabs scienter pleading standard, it
also interpreted Tellabs in a manner that produced a dual-inquiry test in which
plaintiffs may plead scienter from either individual allegations or the complaint’s
collective allegations. Id. at 991–92.  Thus, the court essentially crafted a new
standard, although this Note focuses instead on the court’s retention of the Ninth
Circuit’s prior position on the adequacy of motive and opportunity allegations.
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and in the process renewed its wide split with the Second Circuit.195
While the Ninth Circuit did not mention ATSI when it crafted its
standard,196 parallels exist between the standards of both circuits,197
and the Second Circuit’s role in creating this split is apparent in the
circuit’s affirmation of a standard that the vast majority of circuits did
not employ.
E. The Supreme Court should fortify the Tellabs standard
The Supreme Court must rectify the Second Circuit’s contrary
pleading position and the divergent circuit opinions.  It can do so by
integrating a categorical approach into the Tellabs review process.
The Court should create three categories of plausibility—unlikely,
moderately likely, and likely—that can be applied to the competing
illicit and innocent inferences of a defendant’s mental state depending
upon the strengths of these inferences.198  Under this approach,
courts must first consider all the allegations, assess either inference,
assign it a level of plausibility, and repeat the analysis for the other
inference before determining if the inference of scienter is at least as
compelling as the opposing inference and if the complaint may sur-
vive.199  Further, the Court should specify that plaintiffs can establish
scienter by allegations of motive, opportunity, conscious misbehavior,
recklessness and intent that plaintiffs plead from the complaint’s col-
lective allegations and establish an inference as compelling as the op-
posing inference.200
Adoption of this categorical approach will ensure that courts fully
apply the Tellabs review process.  This approach removes the “magic
195. Gorman, supra note 131, at 28–29 (“[T]here appears to be a split . . . between at
least the Second and Ninth [Circuits] over . . . what constitutes a Section
21D(b)(2) strong inference of scienter.”).
196. Zucco, 552 F.3d at 991–92.
197. Thomas O. Gorman, What Did the Supreme Court Resolve In Tellabs?, SEC AC-
TIONS, http://www.secactions.com/?p=766 (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (noting that
both the Second and Ninth Circuits still apply their pre-Tellabs case law concern-
ing the sufficiency of motive and opportunity allegations).
198. Many of the inferences that arise from commonly-utilized allegations are already
unofficially classified.  For instance, motive and opportunity allegations are gen-
erally regarded as not highly probative of intent and recklessness is considered a
higher form of intent than motive. Supra text accompanying note 60.
199. The Tellabs Court found that “[t]he strength of an inference [of scienter] cannot
be decided in a vacuum.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 323 (2007).  Because the proposed review process considers multiple factors,
it appears consistent with the Court’s directive to avoid an isolated review of
scienter.
200. This finding would avoid the pre-Tellabs confusion over the types of allegations
sufficient to plead scienter.  ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d
87 (2d Cir. 2007).
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bullet” status from motive and opportunity allegations201 and empha-
sizes the categorization of the competing inferences, which indicates
that this process, not these allegations, is the key to discerning
whether plaintiffs have pleaded scienter.202  Under this test, courts
will no longer rely solely on these allegations and fail to conduct the
appropriate review process, but will focus on this categorization
step,203 which requires courts to consider the collective allegations,
the competing inferences, and the strength of the inference of scienter.
This categorization displays the strength of each inference204 and
thus completes the Tellabs comparative analysis, and prevents the
survival of a less-compelling inference of scienter, as could occur
under the current Second Circuit review process.205
If adopted, this approach will effectuate the heightened, uniform
scienter pleading standard that the Supreme Court intended, resolve
the current circuit split, and forestall future conflicts.  The Tellabs
pleading provisions, which correspond with the case’s review condi-
tions,206 comprise the other half of the Supreme Court’s intended
pleading standard.207  The Court’s announcement that plaintiffs must
comply with these provisions,208 coupled with lower court application
201. See Ascher & Tehrani, supra note 4, at 2 (describing motive as “dispositive” to the
Second Circuit test).
202. This focus on classification over individual allegations is consistent with the pro-
cess and result that the Tellabs Court stated is central to any scienter inference
inquiry.  The Court stated that this inquiry does not turn on individual allega-
tions, but instead the opposing inferences must be considered and only an infer-
ence of scienter that is at least as compelling as the opposing inference can be
considered “strong.” Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322–24.  Classification of the
strengths of the opposing inferences appears key to a process that requires con-
sideration of these inferences and an ultimate conclusion as to the relative
strengths of each.
203. One commentator has argued that the standard may be ambiguous for reasons
not addressed in this Note. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs 6–8
(NY Univers. Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 127, 2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=nyu_lewp (analyz-
ing whether Tellabs requires one or two tests for its “cogency and at least as
equally compelling” provisions and detailing Judge Posner’s use of a two-tiered
test).  The implementation of a formulaic, categorical approach is unlikely to re-
solve the ambiguity identified by this commentator, however it may help to clar-
ify other ambiguity regarding the standard.
204. Supra note 197.
205. Supra section II.B.
206. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328.
207. Supra text accompanying notes 150–51.
208. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Supreme Court in Tellabs, an-
nounced that the principles of the review dismissal process promulgated by the
Court also applied to plaintiffs attempting to plead scienter. See Tellabs, 551
U.S. at 328.  Despite the recent failure of the Second Circuit to properly follow
these tenets, the circuits previously uniformly followed one of the Court’s pre-
scriptions, which suggests that future compliance, rather than divergence, may
be likely. See supra text accompanying note 50 (explaining that all circuits
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of the modified Tellabs review process and dismissal of non-compliant
complaints,209 will compel plaintiffs to cooperate with these prescrip-
tions.  Further, the Court’s specification of potentially–relevant types
of allegations will resolve the current, and prevent a future, circuit
dispute over motive and opportunity allegations by providing needed
pleading guidance.210  It will also further demonstrate that plaintiffs
cannot plead scienter using individual allegations.  Given these likely
benefits, and the untenable status quo, the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari and promulgate such a categorical approach at the
next opportunity.
V. CONCLUSION
Now imagine the securities litigation defense attorney reviewing
the shareholders’ class action securities fraud lawsuit against his cli-
ent, which the shareholders’ filed in the Second Circuit.  The plaintiffs
have relied solely on the CFO’s incentive compensation to plead scien-
ter, alleging that the potential for such an award gave him the motive
to defraud and his company position gave him the opportunity to de-
fraud.  Such an allegation might have failed to withstand the strin-
gent Third Circuit pleading requirements and dismissal review
adopted the Court’s finding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
that scienter constitutes “the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud”).
209. Plaintiffs will likely be unable to avoid a court’s dismissal review process, as the
filing of a motion to dismiss is common. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 265 (“[A]
critical defense strategy in all securities litigation is to dispose of the case on the
pleadings.”); Brent Wilson, Comment, Pleading Versus Proving Scienter Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 In the Ninth Circuit After In
Re Silicon Graphics and Howard v. Everex: Meet the Pleading Standards and the
Fat Lady Has Already Sung, 38 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 321, 334 (2002) (“A motion
to dismiss . . . is typically a defendant’s first line of defense.”).
210. An absence of clear guidance from authoritative bodies and rules contributed to
the circuit splits that occurred before and after the passage of the PSLRA. See
Briski, supra note 45, at 162–64 (describing the split between the Second and
Ninth Circuits that resulted from each adopting separate sentences of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), depending upon which sentence each found most
persuasive); see supra text accompanying notes 46–49 for a description of the
Congressional ambiguity that led to the post-PSLRA split.  However, the post-
Tellabs circuit split over motive allegations did occur after the Court clearly
stated its position regarding the adequacy of such allegations. Tellabs, 551 U.S.
at 325 (“[M]otive can be a relevant consideration [in establishing a strong infer-
ence of scienter]”).  See supra section IV.D. for a description of the circuit split.
Despite this, a clear holding by the Court that the most commonly-pleaded types
of allegations are all only potentially relevant to pleading scienter would likely
prevent misinterpretation or retreat by the circuits to their respective prior posi-
tions, as occurred after Tellabs, and therefore would resolve the circuit split.
Supra section IV.D. (detailing the post-Tellabs position of each circuit).  And be-
cause two of these prior splits have occurred amidst confusion over a given issue,
a clear Supreme Court holding on the adequacy of these types of allegations
would not be conducive to a future split.
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process, but it will likely be regarded as sufficient to show a strong
inference of scienter in the Second Circuit.  While the allegation must
itself demonstrate motive and opportunity, the ease with which plain-
tiffs plead such behavior in the Second Circuit211 leaves little doubt
that this allegation will suffice.  Because such an individual allegation
is sufficient to navigate the circuit’s weak, non-uniform pleading stan-
dard, the CFO will likely settle rather than defend the case.212  As the
attorney picks up the phone to offer that advice, he hopes that the
Supreme Court will intervene to prevent circuits like the Second from
creating their own pleading universes through weak, non-uniform
pleading requirements that both allow meritless claims to advance
and force unfortunate defendants to settle these claims.  His client
and others in similar positions deserve nothing less.
Joe Ehrich
211. Supra text accompanying notes 58–62.
212. See Kassis, supra note 11, at 124 n.34; Rossi, supra note 11, at 265; Shannon
Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed Approach to Securities
Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 75 n.96 (2006) (statement of SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, noting “that if the defendant does not prevail on an early motion to dis-
miss, ‘the economics of litigation may dictate the settlement even if the defen-
dant . . . would prevail at trial’”).
